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Abstract
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Over the last three decades, China’s product, labor, and 
capital markets have become gradually more integrated 
within its borders, although integration has been 
significantly slower for capital markets. There remains a 
significant urban-rural divide, and Chinese cities tend 
to be under-sized by international standards. China has 
also integrated globally, initially through the Special 
Economic Zones on the coast as launching grounds 
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to connect with world markets, and subsequently 
through the accession to the World Trade Organization. 
For future policy considerations, this paper argues 
that its economic production needs to be spatially 
concentrated, and its social services need to be spread 
out to the interior to ensure harmonious development 
and domestic integration (through inclusive rural-urban 
transformations and effective territorial development).Market Integration in China
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I.  Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has grown from a low-income to a middle-income 
economy in one generation, benefiting from the 9.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate 
during 1978–2005, up from 4% during 1950–1978 (Brandt and Rawski 2008). Although Young 
(2003) described the PRC’s growth as ―extensive‖ (i.e., the main contribution to growth was the 
addition of capital and labor), he found that productivity growth increased from 0.5% to 3.8% per 
year after the reform, and that improvements in productivity accounted for 40% of overall GDP 
growth from 1978 to 2005. The PRC, in purchasing power parity terms, is converging with Japan 
(from 37.5% of Japan’s GDP in 1978, to 219% in 2004), and the United States (US) (from 3.2% of 
US per capita GDP in 1978 to 15.7% in 2005). Moreover, the PRC’s growth was accompanied by 
dramatic reduction in absolute poverty, which fell from 40.6% of the rural population in 1980 to 
4.7% in 2001 (Ravallion and Chen 2007).   
As  the  PRC’s  economy  grew,  sectoral and  spatial  transformations  took  place.  Agricultural 
reforms enabled a mass exodus from agriculture to nonagriculture activities. Aggregate employment 
in agriculture fell from 69% in 1978 to 32% in 2004. With its increasing integration with the world 
economy, trade increased from 10% of GDP in 1978 to 22.9% in 1985, to 38.7% in 1995, and to 
63.9% in 2005 (Brandt and Rawski 2008). The PRC attracted 40% of all foreign direct investments 
into  developing  countries  between  1980  and  1995,  and  took  in  $70  billion  of  foreign  direct 
investments between 2004 and 2006 (Fan et al. 2009). The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) estimated that the private sector accounted for 59.2% of the PRC’s GDP 
in  2003.  Accompanying  the  shift  out  of  agriculture  into  manufacturing  and  services  was  rapid 
urbanization, rising industrial agglomerations, and increased migration (Cai, Park, and Zhao 2008; 
Fan 2005; World Bank 2008; Huang and Magnoli 2008). With these structural transformations, the 
PRC has not only seamlessly integrated into the global markets, but also experienced increasingly 
integrated domestic goods, labor, and capital markets (Xu 2000, Dong and Xu 2009). 
Relying on several excellent surveys contained in Brandt and Rawski (2008) and some recent 
works that are directly relevant to our topic, we aim to give the reader a succinct summary of key 
research  findings  about  domestic  and  international  market  integration  in  the  PRC.  We  interpret 
market integration broadly—the process in which any resource that increasingly flows to its best uses 
in a larger market is viewed as market integration. We begin by reviewing the evolution of the PRC’s 
global  integration  through  special  economic  zones  (SEZs)  and  accession  to  the  World  Trade 
Organization (WTO), and then move on to examine domestic integration in the regional, product, 3 
 
labor,  and  capital  markets.
2 We  discuss  how  the  PRC’s  international  integration  has  accelerated 
domestic reform, raised per capita GDP, and elevated its economic stature on the global scene. In 
implementing  domestic integration, the  PRC  has been  successful  in  concentrating  resources  and 
production in the coastal regions and allowing for rural–urban migration. People have moved from 
low-productivity sectors such as agriculture to high-productivity sectors such as manufacturing and 
services, as well as from rural poor areas to major cities. Product markets became more integrated 
over time, as regional trade increased and product prices were increasingly similar throughout the 
country. Capital markets, though still dominated by the force of the state, have been improving over 
time, and informal mechanisms arose to improve the state-dominated financial system. We propose 
that the mainstay of a nationally harmonious development strategy consists of measures to facilitate 
agglomerations  that  deliver  scale  of  economies,  rapid  growth,  and  universal  provision  of  basic 
amenities and social services that ensure a comparable level of living standards across the country.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  analyzes  various  dimensions  of 
domestic integration, including urban agglomeration; rural–urban migration; and integration on the 
labor, product, and capital markets in the PRC. Section III assesses the PRC’s international openness, 
through SEZs and WTO accession sequentially. Section IV provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
II.  Domestic Integration 
 
The past 3 decades has witnessed remarkable level of domestic integration in the PRC, more so 
in some markets than in others. People have moved from low-productivity sectors such as agriculture 
to high-productivity sectors such as manufacturing and services. The population of coastal and rich 
regions is increasing at the expense of that in the inland and poor regions. The sharp line drawn 
between urban and rural and state and nonstate has become more blurred over time. Capital markets, 
though still dominated by the force of the state, have been  improving over time, and informal 
mechanisms have emerged to compensate the inadequacy of the state-dominated financial system. 
                                                           
2Given that this survey largely draws from several key surveys, the list of references is not as comprehensive as 
many other surveys. Interested readers are encouraged to read the mentioned surveys directly, and the references 
therein.  4 
 
Product markets have also become significantly more integrated, as regional trade increased and 
product prices became more similar across regions. In the rest of this section, we deal with the 
various aspects of domestic integration. 
 
A.  Regional Integration  
 
New analyses over the last 2 decades of research in economic geography have changed the way 
we  think  about  location  in  development  (World  Bank  2008).  Concentration  looms  large. 
Disproportionately attractive for firms with scale economies, large markets can effectively lower 
costs,  enhance  profits,  encourage  existing  firms  to  expand,  and  attract  new  firms  and  workers, 
creating  a  circular  and  cumulative  reinforcements.  Market  access  and  mobility  do  not  lead  to 
balanced growth of all places. As new producers locate close to the existing production, the gap of 
economic activity between leading and lagging regions widens. Development takes place in waves, 
where  some  areas  are  drawn  out  of  poverty  in  sequence  and  are  pulled  rapidly  through  the 
development process. The PRC’s economic activities are no exception; they have increasingly been 
concentrated in large and middle-sized cities (Chan, Henderson, and Tsui 2008). Indeed, cities with 
higher administrative ranks are larger, richer, and more productive: GDP per capita is 50% higher in 
provincial  capitals  than  in  other  prefecture-level  cities.  Investment  per  capita  and  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI) inflows are four to six times higher for provincial capitals than for prefecture-level 
cities.  
Growth and economic transformation have been accompanied by spatial transformation. Deng 
Xiaoping, the architect of reforms in the PRC, once said that if the PRC were to become rich, some 
people would get rich before others. To implement his idea, Deng Xiaoping initially concentrated 
resources on the country’s coastal areas as launching  grounds  for connecting the PRC to world 
markets.  Partly  as  a  result,  its  eastern  region  (e.g.,  Beijing,  Fujian,  Guangdong,  Shanghai,  and 
Tianjin) has been growing faster than the central and western regions.  
The coastal agglomerations (Bohai and Southeast regions) indeed outperform the rest of the 
country on nearly every investment climate measure, according to a comprehensive review of the 
investment climate in 120 cities in the PRC (World Bank 2006). Differences in city characteristics, 
such  as  per  capita  GDP,  economic  growth,  and  transport  costs  alone  explain  about  33%  of  the 
variation in firm productivity. The PRC’s wealthiest regions tend to attract more capital and FDI 5 
 
(Figure 2). Productivity is significantly higher for the firms located in larger cities and in places with 
a higher share of college graduates, which reflects the benefits of agglomeration of skilled labor 
force. 
Government  efficiency  and  effectiveness  are  highest  in  the  Southeastern  cities  (Fujian, 
Guangdong,  Jiangsu,  Shanghai,  and  Zhejiang),  and  are  lowest  in  the  lagging  Southwest  and 
Northwest. The firms in the coastal areas pay lower taxes and fees; have a much shorter customs 
clearance delay; spend less time dealing with bureaucracy; and spend less on entertainment and 
travel, which are good proxies of local corruption (Cai, Fang, and Xu forthcoming). The survey finds 
that foreign firms operating in the Southeast face considerably lower taxes and fees than elsewhere 
(Table 1) while combined average export/import clearance in the Southeast stood at 7.3 days in 
contrast to the Northwest at 16.8 (Table 2). In the coastal areas, firms reportedly have better access to 
finance, more reliable protection of property rights, and more effective contract enforcement. 
The rising concentration of economic activity in prospering coastal areas has resulted in the 
rising provincial disparities of GDP per capita. Income inequality has been on the rise steadily since 
1980 and then grew exponentially during the 1990s (Chan, Henderson, and Tsui 2008). The ratio of 
the rural per capita annual net income to urban per capita annual disposable income was 61% in 1990 
and 41% in 2004. Per capita GDP gap between the wealthiest and poorest provinces more than 
doubled between 1988 and 1998. This pattern coincided with a substantial net migration into the 
eastern provinces and a net outflow from the central and western provinces (Fan 2005). 
Countries at their early stages of development tend to experience widening regional disparities 
in living standards before slowly converging (World Bank 2008). The PRC’s rapid growth was due 
to its ability to exploit scale economies and take advantage of the world market of unprecedented 
size. The PRC’s GDP per capita today is roughly equivalent to that of Britain in 1911. London at that 
time had a GDP per capita around 1.7 times the national average, whereas East Anglia had a GDP 
per capita two thirds of that average. In the PRC today, the comparable figures are 3.3 for Shanghai 
and one third for the lagging area of Guizhou. Shanghai has a GDP per capita ($16,044), roughly 
equivalent to the British average in 1988, while Guizhou has a level ($1,653) close to the British 
average in 1830 (World Bank 2008). 
Meanwhile, the structural transformation also led to stronger regional specialization. Urban 
manufacturing employment declined steadily throughout the 1990s as the trade sector grew more 
slowly  than  services  (Table  3).  Regions  became  increasingly  specialized  over  time  (Chan, 6 
 
Henderson, and Tsui 2008). Raw Herfindahl index scores for industries for Beijing and Tianjin fell 
between  1993  and  2001,  while  normalized  Herfindahl  index  scores  increased,  suggesting  that 
industry structure in the PRC has become more specialized, and differentiated from the national 
average.  
However, even with the increasing concentration of economic activities in large cities, the PRC 
may still be underconcentrated and underurbanized. Evidence from the 2000 Census suggests that the 
PRC was underurbanized. The PRC ranked low in a worldwide comparison of developing and large 
countries  with  respect  to  the  share  of  its  population  living  in  large  cities.  Its  population  Gini 
coefficient, which in this context means the area between the 45 degree line and the Lorenz curve as 
a measure of the aggregated population share of its cities, is remarkably low for a large country. 
Formal restrictions of the hukou system combined with limited access to housing, education, and 
health care for migrant labor has discouraged migration, while rural industrialization through the 
promotion of TVEs has retained labor in rural areas. Au and Henderson (2006) estimate the efficient 
sizes of cities in the PRC as a function of each city’s manufacturing over service ratio, as well as a 
variety of control factors. They find that the populations of 85% of prefecture-level cities in the PRC 
are smaller than their efficient sizes, and 43% of prefecture-level cities lie below the 95% confidence 
intervals generated by their models. Both results suggest that cities in the PRC are significantly 
undersized.  
 
B.  Rural-Urban Integration 
 
The initial chasm between the rural and the urban in the PRC was deep and wide. After the 
1949 Revolution in the PRC, the country’s leaders promoted the development of heavy industry and 
implemented  a  planned  economic  system  that  fixed  prices  and  allocation  of  all  inputs.  Labor 
allocation  was  conducted  by  the  Bureau  of  Labor  and  Personnel  (Cai,  Park,  and  Zhao  2008). 
Agriculture  was  collectivized  in  self-sufficient  communes  by  1957,  and  any  excess  grains  the 
commune produced were prohibited from being traded. In line with the Soviet economic policy, 
rapid industrialization was the PRC’s focus and urban areas were favored (Chan, Henderson, and 
Tsui 2008) by biasing the terms of trade against farmers.  
The root of the long existing rural–urban division is the hukou (household registration) system, 
which has assigned agricultural or nonagricultural status to every person, mostly based on place of 7 
 
birth. Migration must be approved by the originating and destination governments. In an early effort 
to  reduce  geographical  restrictions  of  individual  activities,  the  introduction  of  the  Household 
Responsibility System in 1978 allowed rural households autonomy in the production and sale of 
grains.  The  spread  of  the  Household  Responsibility  System  drastically  raised  agricultural 
productivity (Lin 1992). Moreover, by 1983, the government allowed farmers to sell their products 
beyond their local (administrative) boundaries (Cai, Park, and Zhao 2008). The government also 
encouraged farmers to explore opportunities in nonfarm township and village enterprises (TVEs). By 
the early 1990s, over 120 million people were employed by TVEs, a rise of nearly 100  million 
laborers since 1978. The TVEs absorbed rural labor and facilitated structural change without sizable 
labor migration, and rural labor markets became more integrated (De Brauw et al. 2002). Since TVEs 
could easily employ labor and enter and exit the market, they exposed the inefficiency of many state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), which necessitated SOE reform through competition.  
By the mid-1990s, food rationing was discontinued and nonstate sector employment began 
growing. Rural labor began seeking urban employment in greater numbers. City governments began 
to realize the benefits of migrant labor to urban economies, and their attitudes toward migrant labor 
started to change (Cai, Park, and Zhao 2008). Instead of arbitrarily ejecting migrant labor, cities 
began to regulate the integration and employment of migrant labor more closely by issuing and 
requiring the submission of identification documents. In addition, some cities and municipalities 
began to sell hukou rights to migrants. It is not surprising that rural migrants became the main forces 
of job mobility in cities (Knight and Yueh 2004; Chan, Henderson, and Tsui 2008). Net rural–urban 
migration during the 1990s was 125.5 million (Chan and Hu 2003). Urban growth doubled to over 
4%  per  annum  during  the  1990s and  2000s,  from  previous  decades  (Table  4).  Net  in-migration 
accounted for 80%–88% of urban population growth.  
Is  there  quantitative  evidence  that  the  rural–urban  migration  facilitated  the  PRC’s  growth 
significantly?  Brandt,  Hsieh,  and  Zhu  (2008)  develop  a  dynamic  three-sector  model  of  the 
agriculture, state, and nonstate nonagriculture sectors to study the composition of labor reallocation 
and growth accounting. They find that the reallocation of labor from the agricultural sector to the 
manufacturing and services sectors reduced the agricultural sector’s share of aggregate employment 
from 69% in 1978 to 32% in 2004. They also find that the reallocation of labor out of agriculture 
contributed 1 percentage point or one eighth of the annual growth rate of per capita GDP in their 
sample period for the PRC. 
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C.  Labor Market Integration 
 
After  the  reforms  of  the  1990s,  labor  markets  in  the  PRC  became  much  more  fluid,  and 
restrictions on labor mobility between regions were relaxed. This mobility was much needed since a 
large number of labor force had been released from the countryside: the agricultural labor share 
declined  from  91%  in  1979  to  61%  in  2003,  and  the  rural  nonagricultural  labor  force  grew 
exponentially,  from  28  million  in  1978  to  188  million  in  2005  (Cai,  Park,  and  Zhao  2008). 
Meanwhile, migrant labor (both hukou and those not officially registered) totaled about 131 million 
between 1995 and 2000 (Cai, Park, and Zhao 2008). The majority is migration to coastal regions. 
Among interprovincial migrants, the percentage going to the eastern provinces from western, central, 
and eastern provinces were 68.3%, 84.3%, and 64.4%, respectively, in 2000, compared with 44.2%, 
61.7%, and 49.7%, respectively, in 1987. Since the eastern provinces tended to be more productive 
(World Bank 2006), such labor movements across regions facilitated efficiency and growth.  
Compatible  with  the  demand-side explanation  of  the  migration to the coastal  regions,  Fan 
(2005) finds that migration between 1990 and 2000 is a response to job opportunities in labor-
intensive  industries  along  the  coast.  Recognizing  mobility  in  fueling  industrialization,  the 
government began to relax restrictions to internal migration. With its one-child policy, the natural 
rate of increase in the PRC’s population is expected to level off in the coming decades, with a 
corresponding drop in the size of the adult labor force. Accordingly, internal migration will play an 
increasingly important role. Fan finds that Guangdong had the highest immigration rate  in 2000, 
which was more than double the highest rate (Beijing) in 1990. Likewise, migration effectiveness—
defined as net migration as a percentage of total migration—in 2000 more than doubled from a 
decade ago. The coastal provinces of Beijing, Guangdong, and Shanghai had the highest net-inflow 
rates; Anhui, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Sichuan had the largest out-migration. Stream 
effectiveness, which assesses the strength of flows from province to province, also suggests that 
migration patterns from the interior to the coast have strengthened since 1990. 
Labor  market  integration  is  facilitated  by  the  PRC’s  growing  private  sector  and  the 
restructuring  of  its  state  sector.  Unlike  Russia  and  the  other  former  Soviet  Republics,  the  PRC 
downsized  and  restructured  its  SOEs  only  after  the  private  sector  grew  sufficiently  to  absorb 
redundant SOE workers (Dong and Xu 2009). In the mid-1990s, a radical ownership reform program 
was launched, under which the state only maintained ownership in large SOEs; small- and medium-9 
 
size SOEs were restructured through privatization, mergers, and bankruptcies. The state’s portion of 
nonagricultural employment fell from 52% to 13% between 1978 and 2004 (Xu, Zhu, and Lin 2005). 
By 2001, the number of SOEs had declined from 110,000 to 53,489 (Cai, Park, and Zhao 2008), 
accompanied  with  massive  layoffs:  at  least  10  million  workers  were  laid  off  by  1997,  and  an 
additional  27  million  between  1998  and  2004.  Growth  of  the  private  sector  cushioned  the 
displacements from the downsizing of the public sector. By 2002, job destruction rates had fallen to 
be at par with job creation rates (Dong and Xu 2009). Moreover, following SOE restructuring, real 
wages grew in the late-1990s and early 2000s (Cai, Park, and Zhao 2008; Dong and Xu 2008), and 
laid  off  workers  were  more  likely  to  be  reemployed.  Another  piece  of  evidence  in  favor  of 
functioning labor market is seen in returns to education. By 2001, each additional year of schooling 
raised annual income by 10.2%, compared to 4% in 1988. College graduates earned 37.3% more than 
high school graduates in 2001, compared to 12.2% in 1988. Zhang et al. (2005) find that returns to 
education were no different between nonpublic enterprises and SOEs, suggesting that labor is mobile 
across sectors.  
 
D.  Product Market Integration 
 
The PRC’s internal markets of goods and commodities were segmented in the early days of the 
reform, but there has been emerging evidence of increasing integration. Perhaps the most influential 
of this literature, Young (2000, p. 1128) argues that local protectionism has led to ―a fragmented 
internal  market  with  fiefdoms  controlled  by  local  officials  whose  economic  and  political  ties  to 
protected  industry  resemble  those  of  the  Latin  American  economies  of  past  decades.‖  His 
explanation  is  that  fiscal  decentralization  links  local  government  revenue  with  local  industry 
protection since local firms are stable sources of taxes and jobs. Based on five fairly aggregated 
sectors, he finds that industrial composition became more similar between 1980 and 1997 while 
prices of goods diverged. Moreover, resource allocation seemed to be deviated from the principle of 
comparative advantage.  
Two studies reach similar conclusions. Zhou et al. (2000) find a general lack of integration 
among the indica rice market in the PRC based on monthly rice data from 12 cities between 1992 and 
1996. They attribute this lack of integration to transport costs and government intervention in the 
grain markets. Similarly, Poncet (2003 and 2005) also suggest that trade barriers within the PRC 10 
 
became more serious in the 1990s. Using provincial trade flow data to investigate the engagement of 
the PRC’s provinces in domestic and international trade, she finds that international trade barriers 
dropped  but  domestic  trade  barriers  (between  provinces)  increased  between  1987  to  1997. 
Interprovince trade flows fell between 1987 and 1997. Barriers to trade between the provinces in the 
PRC were as high as those between international borders within the European Union, or between 
Canada and the US. 
However, evidence based on more refined data supports increasing regional specialization and 
product market integration over time. Bai et al. (2004) use a panel data set of 32 two-digit industries 
in 29 provinces between 1985 and 1997. They look at the patterns of regional specialization of 
industries, and examine how regional protectionism affected the patterns of regional specialization 
between 1985 and 1997. They find that in provinces with higher shares of SOEs, because benefits of 
local protection would be higher (i.e., jobs and direct control benefits), there was lower specialization 
amongst these industries. They also find that industries in provinces that have higher profit and tax 
margins have lower specialization. The higher profitability and tax revenue provided benefits and 
incentives  to  local  governments  to  shield  them  from  competition.  However,  contrary  to  Young 
(2000), they find that regional specialization rose over time, implying greater regional integration in 
the product market. Consistent with Bai et al. (2004), Holz (2009) presents evidence in support of an 
increasingly integrated domestic product market. Similarly, Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2004), using 
the rice market as an example, offer evidence that the PRC’s commodity markets are becoming more 
integrated.  
 
E.  Capital Market Integration 
 
The literature summarized below suggests that formal financial markets are still at their early 
development stage and inefficiency abounds, but informal channels of finances fill some of the gaps 
in inadequate formal financial intermediation. There is no strong evidence yet of increasing financial 
market integration.  
Critics  of  the  PRC’s  financial  system  find  various  indications  of  inefficiency  in  financial 
allocation. The PRC’s financial system is dominated by state-owned banks (Cull and Xu 2000) that 
tend to favor certain sectors and types of firms (such as SOEs). Protection of local jobs also restricts 
capital from moving beyond the local boundary. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2003), using regional 11 
 
level panel data, find that the PRC’s capital market became more fragmented between 1980s and 
2001, and the government tended to systematically reallocate capital from more productive regions to 
less productive ones. Zhang and Tan (2007), using the data of 1978–2001 with four sectors (urban 
industry,  urban  services,  agriculture,  and  rural  enterprise)  in  each  region,  find  that  estimates  of 
marginal productivity of capital were much higher and rising for the rural nonfarm sector compared 
to the other three sectors, and the variability of marginal product of capital rose through 1990s.  
There is evidence that the stock market in the PRC did not function well either. The PRC’s 
stock market was established in 1990, after which the stock market capitalization grew quickly, to 
54% of GDP in 2000. However, there is no evidence that it contributed to better allocation of capital. 
Wang, Xu, and Zhu (2004) examine the effect of public listing on firm performance. They find that 
operating performance in listed firms did not necessarily improve, and some actually declined. This 
could be due to either moral hazard associated with lower managerial ownership stake, or financial 
packaging (i.e., window-dressing a firm’s performance) before listing. Firm performance tends to be 
better when top shareholders have more equal ownership stakes and could monitor one another more 
effectively. The benefits of public listing are mostly enjoyed only by large firms with good access to 
finance, and they tend to be state-owned or state-controlled with poor corporate governance. Thus, 
the stock market has not facilitated small firms’ access to financing, despite their higher returns of 
capital.  
But there are also signs of progresses in the financial sector. The return to capital has been high 
despite high investment rates (at 45% of GDP in 2008). It is highest in the coastal area, followed by 
the central region, then the west region. The dispersion of returns to capital across provinces has 
decreased over time. Bai, Hsieh and Qian (2006) find that the rate of return to capital was around 
25% during 1978–1993, fell during 1993–1998, and stayed flat around 20% since. In the early years 
of the reform (1978–1982), Shanghai had a much higher return than all other provinces, and this 
disparity has reduced over time.  
In  the  prereform  period,  SOEs  mainly  obtained  investment  funding  through  government 
budgetary  allocation,  but  now  bank  financing  is  the  key  channel  for  external  financing,  and  is 
responsive to firm performance (Cull and Xu 2000 and 2003).
3 There were instances where credits 
allocated by state-owned banks to SOEs were rechanneled to the private sector. Cull, Xu, and Zhu 
(2009) find that poorly performing SOEs redistributed loans to other firms via trade credit. Profitable 
                                                           
3However, there is also evidence that bank financing became more inefficient—that is, the link between bank 
finance and firm performance became weaker when banks took on more bailout responsibility in the early 1990s. 12 
 
private firms are also more likely to extend trade credit to other firms without formal finance. Cull 
and Xu (2005) find that access to trade credit helps private firms, and that access to formal and 
informal finance enhances firms’ reinvestments (see also Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005).  
III.  International integration
4 
The PRC has been particularly successful in integrating with the global markets, as it has  
become the low-cost manufacturer for the world and has been steadily moving up the technology 
ladder  into  higher-value  production.  This  has  been  achieved  through  deliberate  opening  of  its 
economy  to  foreign  investment  and  significantly  investing  in  infrastructure  and  education  at  all 
levels—from adopting elements of the European dual vocational training system to building top-class 
universities.  By  utilizing  selective  opening  and  regulatory  reforms,  initially  in  SEZs  located  to 
maximize export potential and then via WTO accession, the PRC managed to generate investor 
confidence, attract foreign investment and know-how, and enter foreign markets for their products. 
The PRC’s integration in the regional and global production networks has increased its economic 
standing on the world stage, and contributed to significant per capita income growth.  
Openness to trade and investment has encouraged productivity growth and competitiveness 
through a variety of channels. First, openness creates market discipline by exposing domestic firms 
to international competition. Second, openness injects capital and know-how. Privatization of firms 
in transition economies to foreign owners considerably improves their performance (Estrin et al. 
2009; Correa, Fernandes, and Uregin 2010). Third, openness encourages reciprocity. Liberalization 
of bilateral market access tends to proceed on a quid pro quo level. Fourth, openness enhances risk 
sharing.  Sharing  capital  investments  with  foreign  firms,  for  instance  in  modernizing  industries, 
shelters domestic companies from some of the risk of falling commodity prices. Diversification, 
encouraged by open markets, reduces the volatility of an economy depending on only a few sectors 
(Tarr and Volchkova 2010). Finally, openness encourages institutional reforms and improvements in 
governance. International investors expect a comparable legal and regulatory environment, which 
also benefits domestic firms. 
The  PRC’s  greater  openness  to  international  cooperation  and  investment  since  1980  has 
modernized  and  diversified  its  economy.  Its  integration  with  the  global  economy  has  helped 
restructuring of its economy, facilitated its investment abroad, and liberalized its domestic markets. 
                                                           
4See Branstetter and Lardy (2008) for an excellent survey on this topic. 13 
 
Selective interventions such as special economic zones and WTO accession have helped overcome 
various barriers to reform.  
 
A.  Special Economic Zones 
Just like in other countries, the PRC’s reformers faced opposition from those benefiting from 
the status quo. The PRC managed to reform its economy by using selective opening and regulatory 
reforms, first in SEZs located to maximize export potential. This reduced rent seeking and opposition 
to reforms in non-SEZ areas. By the time SEZ privileges were phased out and larger parts of the 
economy were reformed, there was enough pressure from export-oriented firms and entrepreneurs to 
counter rent seekers and reform opponents.  
SEZs  can  be  an  instrument  for  the  reform,  and  their  purpose  is  explicitly  to  showcase 
conditions  for  generating  a  dynamic  market  economy  and  to  create  a  strong  constituency  for 
expanding those conditions countrywide. The PRC’s SEZs are effectively early reform zones that 
demonstrate and spread the benefits of good governance. They provide an environment of excellent 
infrastructure,  enabling  services,  market-friendly  institutions,  and  good  governance.  Productivity 
gains  eventually  spilled  over  from  the  SEZs  to  SOEs  outside  the  zones.  Expansion  of  local 
competition among firms also reduced scope for rent seeking among government officials. With a 
more  dynamic  and  market-oriented  economy,  managers  of  private  firms  demanded  greater 
safeguards  for  private  property  rights  and  more  independent  courts  to  enforce  contracts  without 
government interference. Taxation preferences were phased out by 1994 in the PRC when SEZs’ 
business conditions had essentially expanded to the rest of the economy.  
Investors in the PRC’s SEZs during the early days were foreign firms that  brought in new 
technology, global standards, and international managerial practices, and were often found to be 
more productive than domestic firms. Indeed, Xu, Zhu, and Lin (2005) find evidence that foreign 
ownership is strongly associated with higher firm productivity in the PRC.
5 Similarly, World Bank 
(2006) also confirms, with a larger sample of firms, that foreign firms tend to have significantly 
higher productivity in the PRC. 
                                                           
5The three authors examine the effectiveness of privatization or corporatization and ownership structure on firm 
performance post-SOE reform using a 1998 national survey data set on ownership reform of industrial SOEs 
conducted by the National Statistical Bureau. They find that individual ownership (by the employees) has a 
negative impact on firm performance, partly due to the dispersed nature of individual ownership and limited 
number of strategic owners, but foreign ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. 14 
 
Why would adopting SEZs policy be  good for economic growth in the PRC? SEZs, which 
enjoy privileged tax laws, labor flexibility, absorption of FDI, and strategic economic relations, do 
not  make  sense  from  the  perspectives  of  classical  balanced  growth  theories.  Rosenstein-Rodan 
(1943),  Nurkse  (1953),  and  Scitovsky  (1954),  for  instance,  argue  that  since  there  are  important 
interrelationships  and  complementarities  between  sectors  of  the  economy,  all  sectors  should  be 
developed  simultaneously.  Unless  all  sectors  make  progress  simultaneously,  they  argue,  fixed 
investment in any one sector will be unprofitable because other sectors will lag behind and the 
economy will not be able to take advantage of the strategic complementarities between sectors. In 
stark contrast, Hirschman (1958) suggests that countries that do not have resources to develop all 
sectors simultaneously should focus their investment in key sectors.  
In supporting establishment of SEZs, Litwack and Qian (1998) also suggest that an unbalanced 
approach  to  economic  development  could  be  helpful  in  breaking  out  of  a  bad  equilibrium. 
Specifically, during a transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy, a country faces a 
political constraint to satisfy social expenditure requirements, which requires significant tax revenue. 
However, these countries also lack institutions to constrain the state from expropriation. In particular, 
when profits and taxes are low, the government can respond by increasing taxes thereby reducing 
incentives for firm restructuring. This appears to be the case in some transition economies. Russia 
and Ukraine, for example, for a while appeared to be in a trap of continual budgetary pressures, high 
and unstable taxation, significant tax evasion, and low incentives for investment in the economy as a 
whole. SEZs in the PRC were successful because they showcased the benefits of good governance 
and infrastructure, which in turn create the pressure for overall domestic reform. When a sufficient 
number of firms choose to restructure, SEZs can help the economy move into a good equilibrium 
without increasing taxes.  
Litwack  and  Qian  (2008)  distinguish  two  types  of  SEZs.  A  Type-1  strategy  features  high 
investments and very low taxes to maximize incentives in special areas of the economy. A Type-2 
strategy combines high investment with high taxation in special areas to exploit spillover effects into 
the rest of the economy. The PRC’s experience with SEZs demonstrates how the PRC government 
first adopted the Type-1 strategy to develop the SEZs, then moved to the Type-2 strategy to allow 
spillover  of  SEZs  to  the  rest  of  the economy.  Fujian  and  Guangdong,  from  the  outset  in  1979, 
enjoyed remarkable autonomy in setting local investment priorities, selecting investment projects, 
and receiving preferential treatment from the central government. Indeed, firms in SEZs are given 
favored corporate income tax policies, import licensing, tariffs, priority in obtaining Bank of China 15 
 
loans, exemptions on profits remitted abroad, and reduced land use fees (Ramachandran and Cleetus 
1999). Furthermore, private firms are allowed foreign ownership, or allowed to enter into equity joint 
ventures or contractual joint ventures. Most importantly, SEZs are permitted to make investment 
decisions autonomously, unlike the rest of the PRC. The first SEZs in Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen, 
and  Zhuhai  were  chosen  because  of  their  proximity  to  the  major  trading  centers  of 
Hong Kong, China; Macau, China; and Taipei,China.
6 This proximity would facilitate FDI and the 
outsourcing of some production processes to th e PRC. Following early successes, additional SEZs 
were established in Guangxi, Hainan, Liaoning, and the Pudong New Area of Shanghai.  
Policies of the SEZs successfully attracted investment. Throughout the 1980s, domestic and 
foreign investments in the SEZs were high, and most of the FDI went to the SEZs. Between 1979 and 
1994, about 90% of FDI inflows went to the coastal areas. In partic ular, Guangzhou alone received 
40% (Gang 2001). Equally important, Fujian and Guangdong could retain most of their tax revenues. 
Throughout most of the 1980s, Guangdong remitted about 1 billion yuan annually to the central 
government, whereas Shanghai remi tted more than 12 billion yuan. The SEZs of  Fujian and 
Guangdong encouraged firm restructuring, and Guangdong particularly grew faster than the other 
SEZs  (Ramachandra  and  Cleetus  1999).  An  important  aspect  of  the  PRC’s  SEZ  policy  is  the 
targeting  of  particular  sectors,  making  the  development  of  sectors  under  SEZs  unbalanced.  The 
central government defined areas within which a SEZ has comparative advantage, such as light 
industry, textiles, machinery, and electronic goods. Indeed, exports grew substantially for each of 
these industries throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Ramachandran and Cleetus 1999).  
By the late 1980s when firms in SEZs started flourishing, the central government reformed its 
fiscal  policies  toward  the  SEZs  to  garner  more  tax  revenues  and  decrease  its  dependence  on 
stagnating cities and provinces. At this time, Guangdong’s tax burden surpassed that of Beijing and 
Shanghai. The higher tax revenues that were eventually remitted by the SEZs created a spillover 
effect and pulled up the rest of the economy. Investment and fiscal strategies between coastal and 
                                                           
6Hong Kong, China has played an important role in the success of the PRC’s SEZs. In the mid-1980s, firms based in 
Hong Kong, China attracted by lower land and labor costs, started to shift manufacturing to the PRC. This shift 
brought much needed foreign capital, new technology, and modern management know-how to the mainland. By 
the late 1990s, more than half of the PRC’s exports were handled through Hong Kong, China. Of the $45 billion in 
cumulative FDI to the PRC through 1992, 70% came from Hong Kong, China, most of which went to export-
oriented joint ventures. The shared cultural ties between the PRC and Hong Kong, China also reduced the 
perceived threat of FDI to leaders in the PRC, who felt that Hong Kong, China was not much of a “foreign power.” 
Given the export-oriented nature of FDI, SEZs provided much needed jobs for the SEZ provinces. This had favorable 
spillover effects for the region and the rest of the PRC by raising income levels and domestic demand, and by 
facilitating migration from the countryside to cities. 16 
 
inland regions in the PRC had become more equitable by the mid-1990s, demonstrating the positive 
spillover effects from the SEZs on the broader economy. Therefore, throughout the 1980s, the PRC 
employed  the  Type-1  SEZ  strategy  to  adapt  to  a business  environment characterized  by  limited 
investment and weak commitment power of local governments. However, by the late 1980s, the 
strategy evolved into the Type-2 strategy as the SEZs started remitting large revenues, so that the 
central government could better redistribute tax revenues to the other regions. 
Benefitting from SEZs and other measures of international integration, exports of the PRC 
exhibit  rising  sophistication  compared  to  other  countries  with  similar  endowments  of  labor  and 
capital  (Schott  2006).  Schott  suggests  that  the  PRC’s  exports  have  more  in  common  with  the 
members of the OECD than its emerging market peers. The PRC’s leading exports over the last 20 
years shifted from crude oil, refined petroleum products, and apparel to electronic and information 
technology (IT) products. However, the level of technological sophistication of the PRC’s exports is 
probably  overstated.  While  the  PRC’s  value  added  for  IT  products  and  electronics  products  is 
approximately 15%, the PRC’s ―high-tech‖ products actually tend to be relatively low-technology 
(Branstetter and Lardy 2008). Major technology exports of the PRC include digital versatile disk 
players, mobile phones, and notebook computers. Additionally, while the PRC exported $142 billion 
of electronics and IT products in 2003, it imported $127 billion of electronics and IT products. 
Finally, most of the high-technology producers tend to be foreign-invested enterprises that use the 
PRC as a platform for export. Even for these high-technology products, the value added by makers in 
the PRC is limited, with most of the key high-technology components (e.g., semiconductors and 
microprocessors) are imported (Branstetter and Lardy 2008).  
 
B.  WTO Accession 
Prior  to  reform,  imports  and  exports  fell  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State  Planning 
Commission. The PRC’s structure of trade was not related to its comparative advantages—the PRC’s 
primary exports in 1978 were petroleum, crude oil, and apparel. After 1979, the PRC moved from a 
system of strict import and export planning to a complex system of tariffs, quotas, trading rights, and 
inspections (Branstetter and Lardy 2008). From as high as 56% in 1982, the average tariff rate fell to 
43% in 1985 and stayed at that level until 1992. However, between 1992 and WTO accession in 
2001,  the  average  tariff  rate  fell  to  15%.  Prior  to  WTO  accession,  the  government  restricted 17 
 
commodity trade using quotas and import licenses. As tariffs were decreasing, the use of quotas and 
import licenses rose to covering roughly half of the PRC’s imports. 
The PRC government began in 1979 to grant special privileges to firms engaged in export 
processing (i.e., firms that process raw materials or assemble imported goods for export). Following 
reform, joint ventures and foreign-owned firms were in general allowed to import capital goods duty-
free. Thus, by the mid-1980s, the PRC had established dual trading systems: an open regime for 
foreign firms and domestic firms involved in export processing, and a more restrictive regime for all 
the other firms. However, the two regimes were harder to separate than it appeared—leakages and 
smuggling made it challenging to shield sectors of the PRC’s economy from global competition.  
The PRC initially maintained an overvalued exchange rate prior to the reform, so it could 
subsidize imports of capital goods. In order to buttress the value of the renminbi, strict exchange 
controls,  which  included  a  foreign  exchange  surrender  requirement,  were  necessary.  During  the 
reform period, the exchange rate policy was loosened, so much so that the International Monetary 
Fund estimated that the renminbi depreciated by about 70% vis-à-vis the US dollar between 1980 and 
1995.  
The PRC’s overall openness to FDI increased in tandem with its declines in barriers to trade 
and liberalization of its currency. Given the success of its four original SEZs in attracting foreign 
capital, the central government began opening other cities in 1984 to foreign firms. In 1986, the ―22 
Regulations‖ made foreign invested enterprises eligible for lower business tax rates and loosened 
restrictions  on  profit  remittances  across  the  mainland.  In  addition,  export-oriented  and 
technologically advanced projects were given privileges. In the 1980s, FDI came primarily from 
Hong Kong, China; Macau, China; Singapore; and Taipei,China. After 1990, FDI increasingly flew 
in from Japan, the US, and other developed countries. FDI inflows fell in the mid-1990s, but resumed 
following  the  commencement  of  WTO  accession  talks.  What  explains  the  PRC’s  FDI  level? 
Analyzing cross-country panel data of FDI inflows, Fan et al. (2009) find that the main factors that 
attracted FDI to the PRC were the PRC’s high expected growth rate, low volatility of growth, and 
low ratio of dependent population.
7 
What are the macroeconomic implications of the PRC’s growing openness before the WTO 
accession? Branstetter and Lardy (2008) find that net exports contributed modestly to GDP growth 
compared  to  capital  investment  or  private  consumption,  and  thus  FDI  did  not  drive  aggregate 
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economic expansion from the mid-1990s through the early 2000s. In addition, FDI’s contribution to 
capital formation was rather modest (about 7% in 2003). However, the PRC’s increased openness to 
trade and FDI has helped raise overall living standards as consumers in the PRC have benefited from 
lower prices, better goods, and more varieties. The PRC’s openness has also encouraged greater 
competition, exposed inefficiencies, and shifted industrial production. Finally, FDI has contributed to 
spillover effects in skills, managerial know-how, and technological advances.  
The crescendo of the PRC’s openness is, of course, the PRC’s final WTO accession, which 
specified a set of conditions that were stricter than the provisions for other developing countries. This 
was  partly  due  to  the  belief  of  the  PRC’s  leaders—Premier  Zhu  Rongji  believed  that  WTO 
membership was an agent for reform, as the domestic sectors would be exposed to substantial foreign 
competition and investment. It could bring about administrative and governance reforms that would 
instill  confidence  among  domestic  and  international  investors,  encourage  innovative  small-  and 
medium-size enterprises to enter the PRC market, and facilitate dynamic and globally competitive 
businesses.  
For its WTO accession, the PRC agreed to liberalize its manufacturing and services sectors. It 
agreed to lower average tariff levels on industrial products to 8.9%, which was largely accomplished 
by 2005, while tariffs on some important products such as IT products had been cut to zero. The PRC 
also agreed to eliminate all quotas, licenses, tendering requirements, and other nontariff barriers to 
imports  of  manufactured  goods  by  2005,  with  the  exception  of  automobiles.  The  PRC  would 
liberalize its trading system of commodities. The PRC would cease forced technology transfers from 
foreign-invested  enterprises  to  domestic  firms  and  eliminate  local  content  requirements,  trade 
balancing requirements, and foreign exchange balancing requirements. The PRC also pledged to 
shrink  tariffs  on  agricultural  products  to  15%,  eliminate  nontariff  barriers  to  the  importation  of 
agricultural products, issue reformed health and quality standards, and limit agricultural subsidies to 
8.5% of the value of agricultural output.  
In an effort to fully integrate into the global economy, the PRC is also freeing up its service 
sector—including distribution, telecommunications, financial services, professional, audiovisual, and 
construction services—to foreign investment and competition. At the end of 2006, regulators in the 
PRC started regulating foreign banks as if they were domestically owned, and foreign banks are now 
able to offer domestic currency services to citizens of the PRC. While the market share of foreign 
banks in the PRC has remained low and there is regulatory restriction to opening branches, foreign 
banks are taking up equity shares of banks in the PRC. Since 2005, the PRC has removed geographic 19 
 
restrictions as to where foreign insurance companies can do business. Foreign insurance companies 
are restricted to joint ventures with firms in nonlife insurance (51% foreign ownership) and life 
insurance (50% foreign ownership) in the PRC.
8 As a whole, the PRC’s openness to FDI and foreign 
participation in service sectors has been rated by McKinsey & Co. and the International Monetary 
Fund as stronger than that in Japan or the Republic of Korea. 
IV.  Conclusions 
Over decades of rapid growth, the PRC has become a microcosm of East Asia. At one end of 
the spectrum are lagging interior provinces (e.g., Guizhou and Shanxi) resembling the low-income 
countries such as Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic Republic; at the other end are leading 
coastal  provinces  (e.g.,  Guangdong  and  Shanghai)  aspiring  to  be  high-income countries  such as 
Japan and the Republic of Korea.
9 From the angle of total GDP, the province of Yunnan is similar to 
Viet Nam, Sichuan to Malaysia, Guangdong to Indonesia, Shanghai to Finland, and Jiangsu to 
Switzerland (see Figure 5). What connect a ll these regions are increasingly efficient infrastructure 
and shared market institutions. Infrastructure can help reduce economic distances within the PRC, 
but it will never equalize transport costs between coastal cities and the world market, or between 
cities in the interior and the world market. It takes more than 5,000 yuan per kilometer to truck a 20-
foot container to the relevant seaport from Taiyuan; less than 400 yuan from the port of Shanghai. It 
takes more than 15,000 yuan per kilometer to ship t he same container from Chengdu; while it can 
take more than 20,000 yuan from cities in the western regions (Gill and Kharas 2007, World Bank 
2010). There is not much one can do to change this feature of economic geography.  
Over time, the growing concentration of economic activities in the coastal and central areas 
would raise labor and land costs in coastal areas so much that it may be more profitable to relocate to 
the central and western regions. Some of this may already be happening, but in the meantime, there is 
a growing concentration of production in the coastal areas, which can be potentially beneficial for the 
PRC’s economic growth. One has to be patient about spreading out economic production. Economic 
growth  is  inherently  unbalanced  (spatially),  and  to  try  to  spread  out  economic  activity  is  to 
discourage growth. But development can still be inclusive, in that even people who start their lives 
far from economic opportunities can benefit from the growing concentration of wealth in a few 
                                                           
8The PRC has not opened its securities and fund management industries to foreign competition. For example, joint 
venture securities firms cannot trade in “A” shares on the PRC’s exchanges. 
9The concluding section draws from the World Bank (2010, 146–49).  20 
 
places.  And  the  way  to  get  the  benefits  of  both  uneven  growth  and  inclusive  development  is 
economic integration. 
The PRC has been successful in international integration, and it will have to be more ambitious 
in dealing with domestic integration. It is crucial to continue to exploit scale economies in production 
and aggressively address both territorial integration and rural–urban integration. While we applaud 
the PRC’s success in concentrating production in the coastal region and parts of the central region, 
we recognize the need for the PRC to scale up its efforts to improve access to essential social 
services  in  the  western  region.  In  addition,  with  rapid  urbanization,  the  PRC  would  do  well  to 
institute the mechanisms to help towns and cities identify and deliver services—internal, localization, 
and  urbanization-related  scale  economies—they  are  best  suited  for.  Distinguishing  between  the 
geography of economic production and the geography of social welfare is the secret of harmonious 
development.  An  appreciation  for  these  two  distinct  geographies  implies  patience  in  the 
concentration of economic production, and impatience with disparities in social services.  
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Table 1. Average Taxes and Fees Relative to Sales, 2005  (in percent) 




Northeast  Central  Southwest  Northwest 
 
Value-added tax (VAT)  2.8  3.1  3.9  3.5  4.5  4.1 
Income tax  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.5 
Other taxes and fees  **  0.5  0.6  0.9  0.9  1.1  1.2 
Total  4.1  4.5  5.4  5.0  6.3  5.8 
Notes: **Consumption, business, resource, land, and real estate taxes, plus miscellaneous administrative fees. 
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Table 2. Average Days for Customs Clearance, by Region, 2005 
  Exports  Imports  Combined ** 
 
Southeast (coastal)  3.5  4.2  7.3 
Bohai (coastal)  4.4  5.0  8.6 
Northeast  6.4  8.0  12.6 
Central  6.8  8.5  13.8 
Southwest  7.4  8.3  14.0 
Northwest  9.0  7.8  16.8 
Notes: ** Combined time reflects weighting of responses on exports and imports. 
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National employment (10,000s)  8,307  −2.9  4,969  0.72  340  2.0  1,094  6.2 
Beijing employment (10,000s)  152  −2.3  120  8.5  8.2  1.8  109.6  15 
Shanghai employment (10,000s)  269  −3.1  116  1.5  12.6  15  60  9.3 
                 
Coastal share  60 %    50 %    51 %    57 %   
 
Coastal employment growth 
   
−1.6 
   
2.1 
   
3.2 
   
8.5 
Central share  28 %    32 %    32 %    27 %   
 
Central employment growth rates 
   
−4.7 
   
−2.2 
   
0.28 
   
0.5 
Western share  13 %    17 %    18 %    17 %   
 
Western employment growth rates 
   
−4.2 
   
2.6 
   
1.7 
   
9.9 
Source: various years of the China Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Change  in 
Urban 
Percentage 
Components of Urban Growth 






Average Annual Size  Average Annual Size 
Millions  Percentage  Millions  Percentage 
1950–1957  8  5.6  7.2  0.59  2.26  40  3.35  60 
1958–1960  3  10.4  9.1  1.45  1.91  18  8.50  82 
1961–1965  5  -2.6  -2.1  -0.63  2.99  ---  -5.62  --- 
1966–1977  12  3.0  2.0  -0.04  2.09  69  0.93  31 
1978–1982  5  9.0  4.8  0.66  2.01  22  6.69  78 
1983–1990  8  10.9  4.3  0.66  2.85  26  8.04  74 
1991–2000  10  15.7  4.2  1.00  3.16  20  12.5  80 
2001–2005  5  20.6  4.1  1.35  2.52  12  18.1  88 
1950–2000  51  7.87  4.1  0.50  2.52  33  5.10  67 
Sources:  Chan, Henderson and Tsui (2008). 
 
 